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a b s t r a c t
We develop a model of firm behavior in the presence of risk, resource constraints, and a
cash flow constraint. Given imperfect capital markets, the producer confronts an uncertain
cash flow. Utilizing chance constrained programming,we show that an increase in aversion
to liquidity risk can cause an increased allocation to high-risk production alternatives.
With a binding cash flow constraint, risk-averse firms appear to demonstrate risk-seeking
behavior over losses and risk-averse behavior over gains.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Various authors have observed that individuals’ or firms’ tolerance for risk appears to vary depending on the situation.
Friedman and Savage (FS) [1] argue that utility functions take an ‘‘S-shape’’, implying risk-aversion over some ranges of
wealth and risk-seeking over others. In response to this observation, Kahneman and Tversky (KT) [2] proposed Prospect
Theory. Under this alternative normative model, decision makers value gains and losses as opposed to wealth, and decision
weights are used instead of probabilities. In contrast to both FS and KT, we demonstrate that apparent risk-seeking behavior
can result from constraints on the decision makers’ actions and can be consistent with risk-aversion. In our model, we
are concerned with the behavior of firms in jeopardy of failing to meet cash flow obligations. We show that the chance
of cash flow failure leads to downward sloping expected profits in resource endowments and increasing investment in
risky investments as risk increases, i.e., apparent risk-seeking behavior. As Golbe [3] noted, ‘‘firms near bankruptcy may
take excessive risks’’, implying at least the possibility of risk-seeking behavior. Our analytical model of risk-averse producer
behavior under illiquidity risk demonstrates the rationality of that behavior.
Hakansson [4] also considered a cash flow constraint. His intertemporalmodel assumed that the firmmust cash flow each
time period, precluding the possibility of bankruptcy. The effect of Hakansson’s borrowing constraints leads to an apparent
S-shaped utility function. Mahul [5], assuming a discontinuous payoff matrix, found that risk-neutral firms can appear risk-
seeking. Lybbert and Barrett [6] demonstrate that subsistencethresholds lead to an S-shaped reward function and apparent
risk-seeking behavior. Some empirical studies are also available. Audia and Greve [7] investigated shipbuilding firms in
Japan. They report that risk-seeking was observed in small, limited-resource firms that were facing poor performance.
Our model assumes that producers are risk-averse and that capital markets are incomplete. Greenwald and Stiglitz [8]
suggest several justifications for imperfect capital markets and demonstrate that firm behavior is altered as a result. Under
our assumptions, the firm, facing imperfect capital markets, faces liquidation if cash flow generation is insufficient to meet
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needs—including debt repayment. In the presence of binding cash flow constraints, we derive three primary results: (1) the
more averse a producer is to illiquidity, the more risky his/her production strategy; (2) an increase in the riskiness of an
output will induce more production of the output; and (3) a decrease in resource endowments can lead to an increase in
expected profits.
2. The model
Assume an owner–operator has expected utility given as EU[W0(A¯) + π˜ ] where W0 is initial wealth as a function of a
resource endowment A¯ and risky net income π˜ . The owner must allocate the fixed input A¯ between a riskless output L and a
risky output H , i.e., A¯ = AL+AH where AL and AH are infinitely divisible and AL ≥ 0; AH ≥ 0. Returns to fixed cost from each
unit of AL are given as πL > 0 and are certain. Returns to fixed cost from each unit of AH are given as π˜H and are randomwith
meanµH . Further, it is assumed that the lower bound of the distribution of πˆH is less than πL. (Otherwise, L is stochastically
dominated and the allocation problem is trivial.) Then, π˜ = ALπL + AH π˜H − f where f are fixed costs and are non-cash,
such as depreciation. The firm’s output is defined implicitly as F(L,H, x, A¯) = 0 where x, a vector of variable inputs, cannot
substitute for A in the production of L and H .
Given imperfect capital markets, the firmmust cash flow or face liquidation. However, cash flow from operations is risky
because it is a function of risky profits,1 i.e., CF = ALπL + AH π˜H . The business must provide sufficient cash flow to cover
non-expense cash flows (w), such as principal payments on debt and owner withdrawals or dividends. Mathematically,CF(AL, AH)−w ≥ 0.2 Failure to cash flow results in business liquidation. (While some businessesmay be able to temporarily
forgo production expenses in order to meet cash flow obligations, this option can only be exercised a limited number of
periods before profits and cash flows are irreparably damaged.)
Before continuing, the difference betweenw and f warrants some discussion. Principal payments (w) are not expenses,
so are not included in the profit computation. They are, however, demands on the cash of the business. Depreciation (f ) is a
non-cash expense, so it is included in the profit calculation and not in the cash flow calculation.
If written as amathematical constraint, a cash flow constraint is problematic because the right-hand side of the constraint
is a random variable. Charnes and Cooper [10] developed chance constrained programming to address constraint risk. Using
this formulation, positive net cash flow is obtained with some probability β , where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Mathematically, the management problem is expressed as
max
AL,AH
EU[W0(A¯)+ π˜(AL, AH)] (1)
s.t. AL + AH ≤ A¯
Prob
CF(AL, AH)− w ≥ 0 ≥ β.
In this formulation, the decisionmaker is willing to accept violation of the cash flow constraint with probability 1−β where
0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The interpretation of (1 − β) is as a measure of the decision maker’s tolerance for illiquidity. Hakansson [4]
assumed that β = 1, implicitly assuming that an allocation can be found that always cash flows, precluding the possibility
of bankruptcy.
The resource constraint in (1) is always binding since the riskless activity dominates idling some of the endowment. Then
via substitution, (1) can be rewritten as
max
AH
EU[W0(A¯)+ π˜(AH , A¯)] (2)
s.t. Prob
CF(AH , A¯)− w ≥ 0 ≥ β.
The constraint in (2) requires that probability that cash flow net of w is non-negative equals or exceeds the decision
maker’s minimally acceptable probability of cash flow (β). Denote the cumulative density function of cash flow net of w,
i.e., Prob(CF(AH , A¯)− w ≤ 0), as cdf CF (0). Then, the constraint in (2) can then be rewritten as 1− cdf CF (0) ≥ β .
Setting up the Lagrangian and differentiating with respect to AH and the Lagrange multiplier λ gives
max
AH
L = EU[W0(A¯)+ π˜(AH , A¯)] − λ(1− cdf CF (0)− β)
∂L
∂AH
= ∂EU[·]
∂AH
− λ∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
≤ 0, ∂L
∂AH
λ = 0
∂L
∂λ
= (1− cdf CF (0)− β) ≥ 0, ∂L
∂λ
= 0. (3)
1 With borrowing, cash flowwould also be a function of initial wealthW0 . Without loss of generality, we assume that no additional borrowing is possible.
The impact of allowing borrowing up to some percentage of initial wealth is a shift upward in cash flow, which has no impact on our qualitative results.
2 As an anonymous reviewer correctly pointed out, the cash flow constraint represents a short-run shut down rule for the competitive firm in a risky
environment. However, unlike those of Sandmo [9] and others, our rule is an assumption of market place conditions rather than derived from a behavioral
model. The chance constraint represents a barrier to entry and is also an assumed condition.
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The strict complementary slackness conditions require that either (1) the constraint is binding and the multiplier is greater
than zero or (2) the constraint is non-binding and the multiplier is equal to zero. The second-order condition requires that
expected utility is concave in AH given that AL has been eliminated from the argument. The solution to this optimization
model is expressed as
A∗H =

argmax EU[·] if λ = 0 (Case 1)
cdf −1(1− β) if λ > 0 (Case 2)
undefined if 1− cdf (0) < β∀AL + AH ≤ A¯ (Case 3).
The three possible cases are an interior solution (Case 1), a corner solution (Case 2) and infeasibility (Case 3). If the
constraint is non-binding (the Case 1 interior solution), the problem degenerates to the well-known allocation problem
under risk. For our purposes, the remaining cases are of interest. In Case 2 (the corner solution), 1− cdf CF (0)−β = 0. Since
the cdf of net cash flow is a function only of AH , we can solve directly for A∗H from the binding constraint as A
∗
H = A∗H(A¯, β).
Case 3 (infeasibility), when the constraint cannot be satisfied, is also of some interest. In this case, we suggest below that the
logical behavior is to maximize the probability of cash flowing.
Theorem 1. Assume that the cash flow constraint cannot be satisfied with only the low-risk alternative, i.e., A¯πL < w. Then, in
the presence of binding cash flow constraints, a higher degree of illiquidity aversion increases asset allocation to risky production
alternatives, i.e., β ′ > β ⇒ A∗H(A¯, β ′) ≥ A∗H(A¯, β).
Proof. Totally differentiate the binding constraint with respect to AH and β:
− ∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
dA∗H − dβ = 0. (4)
From (4), we find
dA∗H
dβ
= − 1
∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
. (5)
To sign (5), we rewrite the cdf of cash flow net ofw as
cdf CF (0) = Prob

(A¯− AH)πL + AH π˜H − w ≤ 0

= Prob

π˜H ≤ w − (A¯− AH)πLAH

=
∫ w−(A¯−AH )πL
AH
−∞
fπ˜h(y)dy (6)
where fπ˜H is the probability density function of π˜H . Then differentiating (6) with respect to AH yields
∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
= fπ˜H

w − (A¯− AH)πL
AH

A¯πL − w
A2H

. (7)
The first term on the right-hand side of (7) is the density evaluated at a point and so non-negative. The denominator of the
second term is positive. With the assumption that A¯LπL < w, the numerator of the second term is negative. Hence, (7) must
be non-positive, so (5) must be non-negative.
This result has intuitive appeal. Consider a producer facing probable liquidation. The expected utility maximizing
allocation, given only a resource constraint, has a low probability of cash flowing and a high probability of liquidation. Any
alternative allocation that has a higher probability of cash flowing would then be preferable. More importantly, the result
demonstrates that it is possible for a risk-averse decision maker to appear to be risk-seeking. The decision maker’s aversion
to illiquidity risk can force him/her to take risky allocation positions. When the risk of illiquidity is removed or reduced
sufficiently, the decision maker returns to a risk-averse allocation. 
Theorem 2. In the presence of binding cash flow constraints, firms appear to exhibit risk-seeking behavior.
Proof. Consider amean-preserving spread on the density of cash flow fromH . In otherwords, increase the variance of π˜H , σ 2H ,
without increasing its mean. Totally differentiate the binding cash flow constraint with respect to A∗H and σ
2
H :
− ∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
dA∗H −
∂cdf CF (0)
∂σ 2H
dσ 2H = 0. (8)
(Assuming the density of cash flow is given by a bounded and integrable density function with finite variance, the cdf is
differentiable with respect to the variance.) Solving (8) yields
dA∗H
dσ 2H
= −
∂cdf CF (0)
∂σ 2H
∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
. (9)
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As in (7), the denominator of (9) is negative. The numerator is positively signed, as an increase in the variance resulting from
a mean-preserving spread must increase the probability that net cash flow is less than zero.3 Then, given the multiplicative
negative sign, (9) is positive.
This result contrastswith those from the rich literature on decisionmaking in the presence of risk. Baron [11], Sandmo [9],
Leland [12], Batra and Ullah [13] and numerous other authors have found that increasing risk causes risk-averse firms to
decrease output. Our Case 1 (interior solution) would generate a similar result. For Case 2 (boundary or corner solution), we
find that the firm is forced to increase allocation of fixed resources to the high-risk output, leading to higher production of
that output and decreased output of the low-risk output. 
Theorem 3. In the presence of binding cash flow constraints, expected profits may be declining in the resource endowment.
Proof. Totally differentiate the binding constraint with respect to A∗H and A¯:
− ∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
dA∗H −
∂cdf CF (0)
∂ A¯
dA¯ = 0. (10)
So,
dA∗H
dA¯
= −
∂cdf CF (0)
∂ A¯
∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
. (11)
As above, the denominator of (11) is negative. From (6), we find
∂cdf CF (0)
∂ A¯
= −fπ˜H

w − (A¯− AH)πL
AH

πL ≤ 0.
Intuitively, more endowment reduces the probability that net cash flow is less than zero. The result is that the derivative
of A∗H with respect to A¯ is non-positive, indicating that the optimal allocation to the high-risk output is decreasing in the
resource allocation. Expected profit is given as E[π˜ ] = (A¯−A∗H)πL+A∗HE[π˜H ]− f . Taking the partial derivative with respect
to A¯ and rearranging terms yields
∂E[π˜ ]
∂ A¯
= πL + (E[π˜H ] − πL) ∂A
∗
H
∂ A¯
(12)
which is indeterminate in sign. So, over some range of values for E[π˜H ] and πL, expected profit is decreasing in the
endowment A¯. 
This result also suggests the possibility of ‘‘go-for-broke’’ allocations in some situations. As the producer is constrained
more tightly, only high-risk allocations have the potential to generate sufficient cash flow. The lower the endowment, the
more risky the necessary allocation. Another implication is that producers appear to violate a basic assumption regarding
rationality. If we only observe endowments, management actions and profits, a researcher might conclude that producers
are irrational since we can observe profits decreasing in endowments.
Next, we turn our attention to Case 3:what if no allocationwill achieve theminimumdesired probability of cash flowing?
Mathematically, 1 − cdf CF (0) < β ∀AL + AH ≤ A¯. In this case, the decision maker may be forced to adopt an alternative
objective: maximizing the probability of cash flowing or
max
AL,AH
Prob(ALπL + AHπH − w ≥ 0)
s.t. AL + AH ≤ A¯.
(13)
We can solve (13) by solving the constraint for AL and substituting into the objective function:
max
AH
Prob

(A− AH)πL + AHπH − w ≥ 0 . (14)
Rewriting (14), we have
max
AH
1− cdf CF (0). (15)
From (7), we know that the partial derivative of the cdf with respect to AH is negative given A¯πL < w, implying that the
objective function in (15) is increasing in AH . So, the optimal allocation is A∗H = A¯, i.e., a ‘‘go-for-broke’’ allocation.
3 A proof of this argument without assuming a specific density function is elusive. For the uniform density, the proof is easily shown. For other
distributions with a closed-form distribution function, empirical examples readily support this argument.
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3. Implications and conclusions
Our model of a cash flow constrained producer shows that apparent risk-seeking behavior can actually be the result
of aversion to illiquidity. There are interesting practical implications, especially in view of the current financial crisis. For
example, it may well be rational for a troubled, ordinarily risk-averse bank to make more risky loans in response to a loss of
some of its endowment of working capital: the bank may have a better chance to stay solvent if the loans pay off, although
its collapse would leave a bigger hole if the borrowers default.
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